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POPULAR DISCONTENT WITH LAW AND SOME
PROPOSED REMEDIES
DEAN HENRY M. BATES, LAW DEPARTMENT UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.
That the practice of law and the administration of justice are under the
fire of popular distrust and criticism of extraordinary intensity requires
no proof. A fact of which there is evidence in numerous contemporary
books, in almost every magazine, in the daily papers, in the remarks, or
the questions, or it may be in the sneers of one's friends, requires no further
demonstration. The only questions of importance to be answered are to
what extent this criticism and this distrust are well founded, what are the
remedies for such defects as exist, and what are we lawyers going to do about
it. Shall we allow our just indignation at such of these criticisms as grow
out of ignorance and prejudice to blind us to those that are true, or to steel
us into an attitude of indifference to, or of assumed contempt, for this popular
outcry? This would indeed be a course of folly not to say of professional
suicide, one which would inevitably result in the laying of alien and unskilled
hands upon the temple of justice, in crude and ignorant efforts to repair
the breaches in the temple walls and to remodel them to meet the new neces-
sities of changed, radically changed, times and conditions. That this is no
fancied danger we have had already convincing evidence. Our delay as a
profession in correcting defects in our legal institutions, and in adjusting
them to the present day needs of business, industry and contemporary society
in general, has afforded the opportunity, if indeed it has not actually in-
vited, from outsiders countless suggestions of alleged reforms and some well
organized and powerful efforts to accomplish them. These have ranged from
the foolish and sometimes dangerous nostrums of ignorant quacks and dema-
gogues to the well-meant, thoughtful proposals of serious minded and patri-
otic men. Some even of the latter type of plans are utterly impracticable,
or ineffectual or positively harmful while others contain suggestions of merit,
which deserve the serious and respectful attention of the Bar.
But some of our profession are saying that lawyers have always been the
objects of criticism, that this present is but a flurry of a little greater than
ordinary intensity, that the criticism is in the main unfounded, and that
with perhaps a few minor changes in procedure, we can afford to "stand
pat" and let the bluster pass over our heads. This, I fear, would be ostrich-
like strategy exposing our plumage to the rude hands of ignorant vandals.
It is true that lawyers have never been and probably never will be exempt
from attack. Literature from its very beginning has abounded in quip and
quirk, in sarcasm and vituperation at the expense of our profession. In
some primitive societies the profession of law was prohibited. Later Aris-
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PROPOSED REMEDIES 
DEAN HENRY M. BATES, LAW DEPARTMENT UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN. 
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tophanes satirized us most bitterly, and the ironies of Shakespeare, Dickens 
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PROCEEDINGS OF
and many other English authors are familiar to very one. All Utopias ex-
clude lawyers as a matter of first principle. And notwithstanding the prestige
and glory, which a little later they were destined to receive for their invaluable
contributions to the formation and early development of our present form
of government, lawyers were feared and hated in the heroic period of our
history. Thus the citizens of Braintree, Mass., in 1786, in town meeting
solemnly resolved that:
"We humbly request that there may be such laws compiled as may crush
or at least put a proper check or restraint on that order of Gentlemen de-
nominated Lawyers, the completion of whose modern conduct appears to
us to tend rather to the destruction than the preservation of the town."1
And the legislative representatives of Dedham were instructed as follows:
"We are not inattentative to the almost universally prevailing complaints
against the practice of the order of lawyers, and many of us now sensibly feel
the effects of their unreasonable and extravagant exactions; we think their
practice pernicious and their mode unconstitutional. You will therefore
endeavor that such regulations be introduced into our Courts of Law, and
that such restraints be laid on the order of lawyers as that we may have
recourse to the Laws and find our security and not our ruin in them. If upon
a fair discussion and mature deliberation such a measure should appear
impracticable, you are to endeavor that the order of lawyers be totally abol-
ished; an alternative preferable to their continuing in their present mode."2
J. B. McMaster in his history says:
"While, therefore, everyone else was idle, the lawyers were busy; and
as they always exacted a retainer, and were sure to obtain their fees, grew
rich fast Such prosperity soon marked them as fit subjects for the
discontented to vent their anger on. They were denounced as banditti,
as bloodsuckers, as pickpockets, as windbags, as smoothed tongued rogues.
Those who having no cases had little cause to complain, murmured that it
was a gross outrage to tax them to pay for the sittings of courts into which
they had never brought and never would bring an action."3
And during at least two other periods in our history, there seem to have
been unusual outbreaks of criticism upon the law and the courts. Without
attempting here to analyze the causes of popular distrust of lawyers in other
lands, it is sufficient to say now that there is not great similarity between
the earlier attacks upon the administration of law in our country, to which
I have referred, and the charges which are being preferred against our juristic
system at the present time.
Thus the post-revolutionary period of antagonism to lawyers was due
to a lingering hatred of all things English, and lawyers were trained in the
traditions and practiced the principles of the English common law. More-
over, many of them were loyalists. Much of their business at this period
1 Warren History of the American Bar, 215.
2 Warren, History ol the American Bar, 215.
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consisted of the enforcement of contracts, mortgage foreclosures, and other
suits upon debts.4 All this added to the irritation felt by a people among
whom were many whose spirit of independence and whose theories of in-
dividualism approached lawlessness and who fretted under legal restraints.
A few decades later there was another outburst of hostility, but it was pro-
duced mainly by the denunciation by Jackson and his followers of the federal
and nationalistic character of the decisions of the Supreme Court under
the great leadership of John Marshall. Again, just before the outbreak
of the Civil War, the enforcement by the Courts of the Fugitive Slave Law,
the Dred Scott decision, and other decisions involving questions which were
then subject to partisan controversy brought the Courts, at least, into dis-
favor with a large portion of our people. In both of these later periods the
seeds of discontent lay in political conditions, and the hostility to lawyers
and law was largely political. In all three of these periods the special causes
of antagonism were ephemeral in nature, much more so than those conditions
and tendencies which are producing the present onslaught. It is true that
in the earlier periods, as now, criticisms of the courts and its officers were
based in part upon some characteristics of law and some effects of its admin-
istration which not even the intelligent and thoughtful layman always under-
stands, but which are inseparable and always must be, from any general
system of law devised by human minds. Uniformity and certainty in law,
which all lawyers and many laymen understand to be absolutely vital not
only to successful and legitimate commerce and industry, but to the conduct
of human affairs generally, but which nevertheless inevitably work hardships
and injustice in individual cases, the restraints and restrictions and the
conformities which a legal system must always impose, the refinements and
technicalities which must, in some measure, ever exist in the jurisprudence
of a complex and highly developed civilization, the duties and obligations
of advocacy, incomprehensible to many high-minded laymen, these and
many other characteristics of any workable legal system have always pro-
duced and to some extent always will produce suspicions and criticisms of
our profession. A system of ideal law could not possibly be devised, much
less applied to our very imperfect human race. But an ideal system of
law, which is a very different thing, conceivably might exist; but even under
it we could not hope to wholly escape strictures growing out of the general
causes I have referred to.
While, then, among the charges to which we are now subjected, are many
to which the Bar had long ago become accustomed, new grounds of com-
plaint are also alleged, or at least a new and very different emphasis is given,
so that the situtaion we meet is essentially a new one. The fact that the
American Bar has survived previous assaults with unimpaired strength
and prestige is by no means conclusive that we shall emerge as fortunately
from our present unpopularity unless we set ourselves vigorously and thought-
fully at work to remove its causes. Earlier attacks upon the Bar finally wore
themselves out, because the causes of their especial intensity, being ephemeral,
disappeared of themselves; but for parallels to the present situation we must
go back to experiences of our English brethren during certain critical periods






































































































































in the history of English law. As Professor Roscoe Pound, of the Harvard
Law School, has pointed out, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
the common law had become stratified and rigid. Then as now the con-
ception of justice had become too nearly exclusively the legalistic one. The
judgments of the Courts, too often affronted the common sense of fairness
and of justice. Then, as now, there came a rising protest against a rigid
and artificial test of justice. The protest then was against the lack of in-
fluence of the conscience, and the adherence to arbitrary and purely legalistic
rules; now the alarm is struck because of an alleged failure of our courts and
the Bar to perceive and be guided by the needs of society as such, and a too
persistent clinging to the individualistic ideals of the eighteenth century, a
period when the individual might safely be accorded more rights, less re-
stricted privileges in the sparser populations, and the lesser social solidarity
of those days. The danger of that day was met by a more or less forcible
removal of the causes of complaint. The failure of the law courts to satisfy
the national sense of justice resulted in an enormous expansion of the juris-
diction of equity, and an infusion of its principles into the Common law,
which not only materially affected the doctrines of the common law, but still
more radically changed its attitude and spirit. Thus the danger was met
by aid, forced upon the common law it is true, but fortunately aid furnished
by lawyers and legal scholars, even though they were trained in a different
juristic system. A century or so later the tremendous expansion of England's
commerce found English courts and lawyers unable or unwilling to meet the
necessities of an almost new development of the national resources and energy,
and again the situation was saved by aid from without, by the grudging
and reluctant absorption of the Law Merchant.
Is it not probable that the present unrest indicates a recurrence of these
older phenomena, and that now as then, we must save the day, if it is to
be saved, not by making a few reforms in procedure which ought to have
been made long ago (I am speaking now, not of Michigan, but of the country
as a whole), or by puttering with the details of our judicial machinery, but
by a frank and scientific consideration of the needs and the spirit of our
day, and the absorption into our law of the established and proved principles
of contemporary political economy, policial and social science?
Much of the criticism of law and its administration is utterly unreason-
able and unreasoning. Ignorance, prejudice, stupid or artful demagogues,
and the weaknesses of the people themselves are responsible for many com-
plaints. And it is the duty of the Bar, which they cannot too firmly or
often perform, to point out the error, the falsity of such indictments and
to resist with the weapons of knowledge and reason the adoption of meretri-
cious or unscientific measures proposed either by the uninformed, or by wily
demagogues seeking to ride into popularity and public office by appealing to
popular prejudice or passion. And to avoid any possibility of being mis-
understood, let me say that while I by no means approve of some of his sug-
gestions, I emphatically disclaim any intention of putting the former Presi-
dent of our Country, Mr. Roosevelt, in either of the categories just mentioned.
The prevalent criticisms of our juristic system may, for convenience sake,
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would include imperfections in the law relating to pleading practice and
evidence, and their actual administration by our courts; (2) imperfect and
meager organization of our courts; (3) lack of adequate training, and
inefficiency of the Bar, considered collectively; (4) a certain sentimentality
and a lawlessness on the part of great masses of our people, due to our poli-
tical origin, our early history, and perhaps to our national temperament,
if indeed we have one. Evidences of these tendencies are to be found in
outbursts of lynch and other forms of mob law, in maudlin appeals in behalf
of wrong-doers, in the frequent recourse to that unlawful defense the "Un-
written Law" and in that nauseating product of a disgusting New York
murder trial, "Dementia Americana." A brief consideration of some of
these may be helpful in the search for true remedies.
1. I shall make but passing reference to the subject of procedure, not that
I deem it unimportant, though I agree with the statement of Mr. A. B. El-
dredge, our president last year, that Michigan has a simpler and better pro-
cedure than the great majority of our states. I refrain from discussion
of this subject because it has recently been treated by two of our prominent
members with a learning and effectiveness which I could not hope to equal.
I refer to the admirable paper read at our last meeting by Judge Chester L.
Collins and printed in the proceedings of that meeting,5 and to the scholarly
and enlightened discussion by Judge Willis B. Perkins, recently published in
the Michigan Law Review." We are all agreed, that as to the country
as a whole, there is urgent need of greater simplicity and directness in plead-
ing and practice, and an elimination of all unnecessary technicalities and
delays, which at present are often the instruments of injustice and oppression.
We should not hesitate to make our procedure conform to our changing
conditions and needs in the effort to make justice speedy, certain and avail-
able to all. The lawyer, who is uninformed as to the history of his science,
and thinks of it as rigid dogma, emanating from some mysterious source,
unresponsive to the necessarily changing needs of society, a science which
he practices as a trade, is prone to make a fetish of that particular form of
procedure, to which he happened to have been apprenticed, and beyond
which he has not permitted his vision or his imagination to penetrate. The
law, substantive and procedural, is no sacred relic, the exclusive product
of other ages or of mysterious and immutable principles, which would shrivel
at the touch of human hands, or wither in the radiance of the fresh air of
reasonable inquiry by contemporary society. Rather it is a living, pulsating
thing, the product of human conduct in a constantly changing environment
which requires nourishing and pruning as well, at the hands of succeeding
generations. Procedure in most of our states, except as to some funda-
mental features common to nearly all juristic schemes, possesses little that
has even the venerability of mere age. Yet in many of our jurisdictions,
as in our neighboring state, Illinois, and even in enlightened New England,
a contrary, erroneous view, or other cause is preserving a procedure whose
archaic form and spirit will soon place it among the great and mysterious
wonders of the world. Fortunately former President Taft, Senator Root,
5 Mich. State Bar Proceedings, 1913, p. 43.






































































































































and many other public spirited leaders in our profession and many Bar
Associations are leading the way in demanding reform in this matter.
2. We have paid little attention in this country to the vitally important
matter of the organization of our Courts into an integral system, despite
the instructive and brilliantly successful experiments of Great Britain during
the last forty years. And yet we are surprised at the great expense of main-
taining our courts, their inability to promptly dispose of the mass of litigation
which at present is clogging their machinery, the numerous conflicts be-
tween Courts of concurrent jurisdiction, and their lack of coherent, efficient
administration as a system. This is no fault of our judges personally, nor
do I mean to accuse our individual courts of inefficiency. Professor Pound,
in an address before the Law Association of Philadelphia, delivered January
31, 1913, clearly delineated the characteristic judicial organization of this
country and the unfortunate results of its many imperfections. These may
be summarized as follows: We have ordinarily at the bottom of our system,
justice of the peace or magistrate's courts with jurisdiction in petty civil
and criminal cases, and authority to bind over persons deemed guilty of the
graver criminal offenses to a court of general jurisdiction. The most glaring
defects in these courts are (1) that they are too often presided over by lay-
men, who not infrequently are besides, persons so lacking in character and
general ability as to wholly fail to command the confidence of litigants
and attorneys. Not long ago I attended a meeting of one of Detroit's law
associations, at which prominent members of the Bar denounced some of
the justices of that city for sloth, incompetence and other failings, in un-
measured terms, and no word of denial or extenuation was heard in reply.
This may be the reason why practically every case tried by these courts
may be appealed to a superior court or courts, there to be tried de novo. This
right alleviates one vice in the system, at least for those who can afford the
expense of an appeal, but in the majority of cases it imposes wholly uneces-
sary delay, expense and irritation upon litigants. The second rung in our
judicial ladder, if indeed by any stretch of imagination our system can be
considered as unified as a good dependable ladder, is usually made up of
probate courts. The same objections, though in less degree, may be charged
against these courts as against the justice of the peace tribunals. Too often
the probate bench is occupied by unqualified persons, too often their cases
may be tried de novo on appeal to the general court of first instance.
We have next nisi prius, or trial courts of first instance, with general
jurisdiction in civil and criminal causes, and again the practically unlimited
possibility of appeal to a higher court. There may be separate criminal,
common law, chancery and other courts in this class, or the same result
may be reached by corresponding branches or divisions of this general court.
Finally there is the Supreme Court, with the major part of its jurisdiction
purely appellate. Considering the system in its entirety these criticisms
are suggested. There is no real co-ordination of the many parts of the scheme,
no unity. Rather we find a series of courts, related it is true but with no
supervisory head, to give coherence and unity to the activities of the com-
ponent parts. The Supreme Court by its decisions establishes the law,
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procedure and in the application of law to the cases coming before them the
Supreme Court has very little power. It may, if the parties can afford to
appeal, correct errors made below, but in many instances only after a series
of expensive and time-consuming appeals, and often only after some measure
of harm has been done.
Even in courts of the same grade and jurisdiction there is no integral re-
lation. On the contrary the several Circuit Courts for most purposes may be
likened to a series of separate compartments, and they in turn are divided
into sections and then cross-sectioned, and woe betide the litigant who gets
his case into the wrong compartment. Thus we are affronted with conflicts
of courts of concurrent jurisdiction sitting even in the same city. The liti-
gant who gets into common law when he should have gone into equity must
back out as best he can and begin all over, and even this poor consolation
is sometimes denied him by lack of funds or a statute of limitations. Be-
cause of a lack of a central supervisory authority the Circuit Courts in some
counties may be submerged in a mass of litigation, while judges and their
aides are idle in other counties for sheer lack of business. Finally in our
own state we over-burden our Supreme Court by compelling it to take juris-
diction of almost any controversy no matter how small the amount involved
and whether or not any right or principle at all is in issue. When we compel
seven Supreme Court justices to hear arguments, read briefs and records
and solemnly adjudicate a litigation involving only the title to a hen-turkey
something is wrong. I know it will be said the poor man as well as the rich
is entitled to have the opinions of our highest tribunal upon his case; but
this is a superficial and specious argument. It is the poor man who for
obvious reasons is the most immediate sufferer from this situation. I know
it will also be said that to raise the jurisdictional amount for the Supreme
Court will destroy business and injure lawyers. Even if this were true,
it is an unworthy consideration, for the interests of litigants, the welfare
and interest of the state in avoiding litigiousness, in keeping down the expense
of maintaining our courts, and above all in enabling its court of last resort
to adequately study and rightly decide the cases that come before it, are
of paramount importance. But I seriously doubt the validity of the premise
upon which even the unworthy argument of the selfish interest of the Bar
proceeds. It is the mass of defects in and reproaches upon our system,
which we have been considering, that is driving business men and others
away from Courts and lawyers, that is leading people to compromise or to
buy peace rather than settle even their genuine and substantial disputes
by law, that is influencing those who are unable to keep out of the courts
to confide their interests and the conduct of controversies to trust companies,
insurance and fidelity companies and other corporations. It is this sort of
thing among other causes that is influencing the public, the state, to entrust
more and more of its business to administrative commissions, like railway
and warehouse boards, industrial accident boards, and public utilities com-
missions, rather than submit even its controversies to the care of lawyers
and the arbitrament of law courts. In fact there is some measure of truth






































































































































what excitedly entitled "The Passing of the Legal Profession,"6 that busi-
ness corporations organized to practice law, for profit, and government
commissions are driving us out of business. These matters are all well
known to our profession, and yet we are doing little about it. The pressure
for improvement is coming altogether too much from outside, too little from
our own ranks. Even if we were actuated by nothing higher than selfish
motives, is it not apparent that it is high time we were setting ourselves
seriously and vigorously to the task of setting in order our house, which we
like to call the Temple of Justice?
So far as we in America have made effort, worthy of mention, to remove
the clogging mass of delayed litigation in our courts, it has been by such
ineffective methods as increasing the number of judges, and by organizing
new courts for special purposes. In fact one of the striking phenomena in
the contemporary history of our judiciary is the establishment of a large
number of special courts, and proposals to establish many others. The
Juvenile Courts, Domestic Relations courts, the Commerce court, the many
quasi-judicial bodies already referred to, and the proposed Midnight courts,
Sunrise courts (and who can say but we shall have red-light district courts in
name as well as in fact) are all symptoms of a disease, and indicative of efforts
to cure it. The theory of specialized courts is in accord with the general
principle of division of labor, and is doubtless sound, but too often the realiza-
tion of its possible benefits is partially frustrated by too great segregation,
and by the foolish plan of rotation among the judges, a scheme which effec-
tually prevents any of them from becoming expert.
There is not time within the limits of a general paper to suggest in detail
a plan of court organization, but the general principles upon which a system
vastly superior to our typical American system may be constructed, may
be derived by a study of the modern English judicature act.7 We should
have one single court, whose administrative head should be a judicial officer
with power to classify, distribute and assign the business of the court to
the appropriate divisions or branches thereof to assign the judges to the
various divisions and localities, and as occasion may arise to re-assign them
to meet the changing exigencies of the more or less regular ebb and flow
of litigation, or the extraordinary and temporary needs caused by illness,
or other accident. In short, this Chief Justice, if such he is called, should
be given power to effectively control and utilize the entire judicial machinery
of the state, and he should be made responsible for doing so. The court should
probably have three main divisions; (1) a court of limited jurisdiction,
civil and criminal, somewhat like the Municipal Court of Chicago; (2) a
superior court of first instance with general jurisdiction, and (3) a Supreme
Court which should be not only the court of last resort, but in which should
sit, it seems to me, the supervising officer above referred to. The Municipal
Court of Chicago affords fair proof that such a scheme is well suited to the
conditions in America, as is shown by Professor Pound's summary of its
report for 1911:
'22 Yale Law Journal, 590.
7 The following suggestions have been derived mainly from a study of the English
courts, and the Municipal Court of Chicago, which is modelled after them, but I am
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"That such a plan is feasible, and something of what it might bring about
in competent hands, is shown by the experience of the Municipal Court of
Chicago, the pioneer modern judicial organization in the United States.
That court is not at all the petty tribunal which its name might imply. It
has unlimited jurisdiction of actions upon contract and of actions for con-
version of or injury to personal property. By construction of the statute, it
has unlimited jurisdiction of actions against carriers of passengers for personal
injuries. It has also general jurisdiction of all causes where the amount
claimed by the plaintiff does not exceed $1,000 and a general magistrate's
jurisdiction. In 1911, the last year for which as yet we have a report, 53,223
civil cases were brought in that court, of which 50,931 had been disposed
of at the end of the year, the difference consisting of new causes not ripe
for disposition. During the year the court rendered money judgments in
civil cases amounting to $4,096,254.28, an amount equal to the sum of the
judgments rendered during the same period by the High Court of Justice of
England. But during the same period the court had before it 9,256 prosecu-
tions for felonies, 11,770 prosecutions for misdemeanors, and 71,434 prosecu-
tions or penal actions for violation of city ordinances, a total of 92,730.
In other words, this court of twenty-eight judges, thanks to a modern
organization and simple procedure, disposed in 1911 of 145,953 causes.
These figures speak for themselves."
"Of no less importance, though I can speak of it but briefly, is organi-
zation of the business and administrative side of the court. Legislation
ought not to prescribe the details of this organization. So far as possible,
the court should be allowed to settle them by rules devised, amended or
abrogated as experience dictates. But, above all, the court should be given
control of the clerical and administrative force through a chief clerk, re-
sponsible to the court for the conduct of this part of its work. We have
hampered the administration of justice by the extreme to which we have
carried the decentralization of courts. In more than one jurisdiction the clerks
are independent officers, over whom the courts have little or no control. Even
clerks of supreme and intermediate appellate tribunals are sometimes
elective officers. Nearly everywhere the clerk of the court of record of
general jurisdiction in each county is elected. Thus, he is under no ad-
ministrative control and is largely free from judicial control. Each
clerk's office is independent of every other. It is no one's duty to study
the system, suggest improvements or enforce them where obviously they
should be made. What responsibility will do in this connection, when
joined to corresponding power, is shown in the Municipal Court of Chicago,
where the system of abbreviated records is said to have effected a saving
of $200,000 a year. Moreover, if courts are to do the work demanded of
the law in large cities of diverse population and in industrial communities,
they must develop much greater administrative efficiency and must be able
to compete in this respect with administrative boards and commissions.
In the conventional American judicial organization, the administrative officers
of importance are elected independently, have sole control of their offices,
and are responsible only to the electorate. Here, too, the advantage of a






































































































































cause of its complete control over such matters, the court has been able to
set up a bureau of information, to which the citizens may apply to learn
what the court can do for him and how to apply for its assistance,
or, if it has no jurisdiction, whither he should turn. It has also pro-
vided a woman "social secretary," to whom women may apply in matters
of delicacy. It has made some progress as a court of conciliation to prevent
litigation. And, what is more useful still, it has been able to work out and
constantly to improve a system of judicial statistics, and from study thereof
to better its administration of justice at many points. Thus, the court
becomes not merely a machine for deciding cases formally presented but
a bureau of justice."
The Chicago Court which has been a model much referred to, is unfortu-
nately menaced in a manner and from a quarter most discouraging to be-
lievers in unlimited democracy as applied to judicial officers. The court
has, of course, experienced that loss in efficiency in its personnel which the
exigencies of politics have inflicted in varying degrees upon almost all Ameri-
can tribunals. But this evil has been intensified in the Chicago court by
the unfortunate working of the primary elections, by which candidates for
the Bench are chosen. Apparently, experience, efficiency, learning in the
law have counted for little with the Chicago electorate in its choices for this
court. On the contrary, we find that every race, every nationality in that
great international "melting-pot," every sect, every fraternal organization,
every political faction and every locality is likely to put forward its "favorite
son," with very little regard to his qualifications for impartial and effective
service upon the Bench. These are the considerations that have counted
heavily, and in consequence there has been a decline from the standard of
the satisfactory set of judges with which the court began its history. But
a reorganization of our courts on the basis of a plan combining the best features
of the English system and of the Chicago court, with such other provisions
as may be locally desirable, would certainly decrease the cost of court main-
tenance, it would do much to correct many so-called defects of procedure,
and would result in a more prompt, accurate and efficient administration
of justice.
3. The lack of adequate training of the Bar, the third cause of the defects
in our legal system is, in my opinion, the most fundamental of all, though
it has received little popular attention because it is less apparent to super-
ficial observation, and because the removal of this cause involves the adoption
of some remedies which run counter to certain false but rapidly disappearing
prejudices, mistakenly associated with the splendid principles of true demo-
cracy and true Americanism.
We in America have notably failed to insist upon the possession of
adequate general training, legal learning and sound character as a nec-
essary condition of admission to the Bar. As compared with the legal pro-
fession in England, Germany, France and in fact nearly, if not all, of the
European countries, and with the medical profession in our own country,
our requirements of qualification for the right to practice are conspicuously
low. This is due principally to the conditions under which the profession
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vival of certain early prejudices, clustering around the erroneous assumption
that any American, with or without training, can successfully do anything,
and that to require proof of adequate education, general and legal, and of
ability to apply one's learning to legal problems, involves closing the door
of opportunity, and is therefore undemocratic and un-American. One hesi-
tates to discuss the problem involved in these prejudices for his spirit and
motives, and indeed what he plainly says about it, almost surely will be
misunderstood by some good people and misconstrued by others not wholly
disinterested. And the fact that many lawyers have achieved not only
eminence at the Bar, and distinction in public life, but also profound
legal learning and insight, with little or no formal education is sure to be,
as it always has been, urged as proof that education is not necessary. The
case of Abraham Lincoln who laid the foundation of a distinguished legal
career in the bare loft of a rude cabin, where, after his day's work, by the
flickering light of a tallow candle or a pine knot, he pored over borrowed
copies of Blackstone and a few elementary treatises on English law, is cited
as proof positive that school or college training is superfluous. This is a very
shallow and partial view of the matter. We all glory in the career of Abra-
ham Lincoln and the many other self-trained lawyers who have honored
the Bar and served their country with distinction. No one with any under-
standing of American life could seriously propose any standards or rules
of admission to the Bar which could possibly deny to an Abraham Lincoln
his opportunity. Indeed the complete refutation of this whole argument
lies in the simple fact that no rule or set of rules could bind an Abraham
Lincoln, for he would find a way to meet all of them. Any strong man, even
though he wholly lack the genius of Lincoln, can comply in these days with
any standard seriously proposed for admission to the Bar.
There is no danger in this country of an aristocratic or exclusive Bar.
Such an organization would not be tolerated; it could not survive in free
American air. The truth is that at present in most of the states it is easily
possible for men of poor ability to go to the Bar without having undergone
any serious and sustained exertion, much less any sacrifice, to qualify them-
selves to begin the practice of law. In medicine, in all but one state, the
law, or the rules of authorized boards, provide that no one may be examined
for a license to practice unless he is a graduate of an approved medical school;
and an approved medical school is defined as one with adequate and specified
laboratory and library facilities, a competent faculty, a four years course,
and in some states as requiring some college work for admission to the school.
No state in the country makes anything like equivalent requirements for
admission to the Bar. As a result we have, as every candid man must admit,
large numbers of ignorant, untrained, inefficient lawyers everywhere. The
Bar is over-crowded, with a resultant cut-throat competition, that cheapens
professional service, destroys esprit de corps, and subjects all but the stronger
members of the Bar to cruel temptation to fall into undignified and even
more censurable methods of getting a business and a livelihood. This "moral
overstrain" as it has been called, is responsible for many unethical practices,
and many a lawyer's down-fall. Despite the many brilliant men at the






































































































































working majority, the fact that the lower ranks are so largely filled up with
half-baked men of small ability cannot be successfully denied. This un-
questionably makes the Bar less efficient than it should be, and among the
results are slovenly services and misleading advice to the very class of clients
who can least afford to make mistakes, unnecessary litigation growing out
of legal blunders, and frequent miscarriages of justice. On the public side,
as lawyers constitute a large proportion of legislative and administrative
officers, and practically all of our judicial officers, the making, interpretation,
application and enforcement of our law, suffers, to the manifest injury of
the entire body politic. And this is all utterly needless, and productive
of good to no one, perhaps least of all to the unqualified lawyer who should
have been excluded from our ranks, if he were unwilling to properly prepare
himself for his high calling.
It has been a favorite cry of the apologists for an easy and painless ad-
mission to the Bar of all who may apply, that society can be depended upon
to weed out the unfit in the course of time. This is measurably true, but
who can calculate the frightful cost to individuals, the economic waste to
the community? How is this unintelligent process accomplished? By per-
mitting the inadequately qualified barrister to hold himself out as a duly
admitted member of a high profession, an officer of the courts, a minister
of law, and thus to begin his experiments upon individuals and society. And
what finally eliminates him from a service for which he is unfit is the con-
templation by an injured and suffering community of his record of incom-
petency, of blunders, of clients perhaps irreparably injured in property,
reputation or life itself. Nothing could be more disastrous, more cruel to
the unfortunate lawyer himself. For lack of intelligent supervision by the
State he has been allowed to spend time and money in getting a sufficient
smattering of law to admit him to the Bar, and there he has spent more
precious years of his life and perhaps more money in the vain effort to estab-
lish himself as a lawyer, and too often he then turns hopelessly to other occu-
pations for which perhaps in his youth he might have fitted himself worthily,
a defeated, broken man. The loss to society is perhaps more difficult to trace,
but in the aggregate it is enormous.
It is no answer to a plea for higher qualifications for the Bar to point out
that a very large percentage of successful lawyers during our early history,
and to a small extent even now, have had only meager and informal training.
In the very beginning of our profession in America, the leaders of the Bar
were for the most part men of the highest training, for which many of them
went to English Universities, and the profession as a whole for a generation
or more after the Revolution was in fact as in name relatively a learned
profession. But then followed a long period as our population spread west-
ward, when the exigencies of the national life, and the difficulty in the newer
country of getting an education, general or legal, brought about a decline.
Now in a community in which very few are well educated, obviously the
entire practice must be adjusted to the attainments and standards of the
many, and therefore the relatively high rank and the success of an individual
lawyer in such a society, affords no argument that in a succeeding generation
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more complex and difficult situation and with the more highly trained courts
and competing lawyers of that day. That is the point. Our successors
must meet a very different situation from that which we have faced. Our
entire civilization is more complex, more difficult, and it is growing still more
so. The welfare of our professional successors and that of the state demands
that we equip them for the struggle with a more thorough and more scientific
training than we ourselves had. We must not be sensitive about this. We
are, in our richer generation, able to do more for our successors than our
predecessors could do for us.
Such advances in the requirements for admission to the Bar as are being
urged by those who are thinking most seriously about this problem are en-
tirely reasonable and are within the reach of any American who has sufficient
ability, energy and character to creditably perform the functions of a lawyer.
The best law schools in the country, with only one or two exceptions, are
now requiring one or more years of college work before the student may
begin the study of law. Experience in our own State University and every-
where else has amply justified this requirement. It has produced increased
efficiency and scholarship, a higher type of classroom discussion, a better
grasp by all students of legal principles. But it is not proposed to demand
college work for admission to the Bar. We should, however, require a high
school training or its equivalent, and the completion of a course in a law
school, properly manned, and equipped with a three years course, to which
the student must give his preponderant energy and most of his t'me. In
these days of public schools within easy reach of everyone, with colleges
and universities dotting the land, with the numerous opportunities for stu-
dents to earn money in term time as well as in vacation, with scholarships
and loan funds available for many, above all in a country prosperous beyond
any in all previous history, there is no excuse for any worthy American boy,
if he wants to become a lawyer, failing to get at least the minimum of train-
ing suggested for admission to the Bar. We need not worry about the few
exceptional cases of those who through accident or misfortune find it difficult
to go that far. Almost every rule of administration should provide for the
exceptional treatment of the really exceptional cases. But rules must be
made for the many and not for the few.
There is now practically no dissent to the proposition that every law student
should first have had a high school training. The time has now come, in
the judgment of those best qualified to speak, when we should insist, as have
our medical friends in their field, that candidates for admission to the Bar
must complete a course in a reputable Law School, and that term should be
adequately defined in the statute or the rule of court making the requirement.
The law office no longer affords a satisfactory means of acquiring a legal
education. The conditions have so changed and the exactions upon the
practicing lawyer are now so severe that it is impossible for him to give to the
student the time and careful thought which legal education now demands.
Moreover, the advances in the science and art of teaching law made by the
better law schools during the last twenty or thirty years have revolutionized
legal education, and the gap that exists between the best that the law office






































































































































that the State is no longer justified in accepting the former as an equivalent
for the latter, or as qualifying a man (exceptional cases excluded) for admis-
sion to the Bar. There is still a great field in legal training for the law office,
a field which the law school can never fully and perfectly occupy, but that
field consists of an apprenticeship in which the student, who already has
acquired his training in the theory of law, and who has had his powers of
legal analysis and legal reasoning developed by the intensive methods now
employed by the law school, is by the law office trained to apply what he
has acquired to the actual work of practice. Ultimately, I hope we shall
require, as they now do in Germany and some other countries, a period of
apprenticeship in law offices, (during which, however, the student may earn
some money) before he is permitted to practice independently. But this
experience should never be accepted in lieu of the law school training. The
two are entirely distinct and both are necessary under modern conditions
to the production of a lawyer capable of beginning practice independently
without acquiring his education at the expense of clients.
Moreover, law cannot be most effectively taught by correspondence or in
those diploma mills mistakenly called law schools, run with a sole eye to
profit and demanding only those remnants of the students' time and energy
left after a full day's work in other fields. It should be said that while all
proprietary and all night schools necessarily labor under disadvantages
as compared with the state and university law schools, some of them are
at least conscientiously and intelligently conducted. On the other hand there
are schools in which everything is subordinated to the making of money
even at the expense of flooding the country with half-baked and unqualified
lawyers.
I am not making any plea for favor or advantage to State University Law
Schools. As the practice of law is a privilege affected with a public interest,
and of vital importance to the welfare of the community and of government,
the State would be amply justified in insisting that lawyers be trained under
state supervision, but I am not advocating even that. In our own State
University we are under no need of compelling students to come to its De-
partment of Law. We conceive the law school not to be an end in itself
but only a means to an end, and that end is the service of the profession to
which we belong, and particularly the service of the State, which has so
generously supported its University. All that I advocate then is that the
State exercise a supervision over all legal education, not only in its own school,
but in such private schools as it permits to exist, and that in determining
what are proper qualifications for admission to the Bar, and in administering
these qualifications, it consider only the welfare of the state, and that it give
no heed to any consideration affecting the private interest of schools or of
individuals, whether connected with proprietary or State Law schools.
I believe that in this state we have entered upon a new and hopeful policy
of dealing with the problems of which I have spoken. The bill relating to
admissions to the Bar passed by the Legislature at its last session, while
admittedly not perfect because certain compromises were made in it, is
nevertheless a vast improvement over the old law, and puts us in advance
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Law Examiners is one admirably equipped to deal with the large responsi-
bilities put upon it by this new law, and its members have evinced a high
sense of public duty and a keen appreciation of all of the elements involved
in preparing to meet the new situation. The best interests of all our pro-
fession and of the administration of justice require, in my opinion, a close
co-operation between the State Bar Association, the Board of Law Examiners
and the court which it represents, and the State Law School, and signs are
not lacking that we have entered upon a period of such co-operation. I
venture to add that there is no ambition which I cherish more fervently
than that of contributing in some small way to the aligning of the agencies
and organizations which I have just mentioned in a common effort to restore
to our profession any of the prestige and prosperity which it may have lost,
and to advancement of the welfare of our State and the great cause of social
justice, new phases of which are appearing to us daily in our constantly
changing society.
It is not pleasant to consider the defects of the profession to which we have
devoted our lives, but it is far better that we who are most deeply interested
in it, should candidly investigate the criticisms that are so freely passed
upon it and then proceed with care, but promptly to cure such ills as exist,
and cure them in a lawyer-like way, rather than by inaction to permit out-
siders to force upon us bungling, ineffective and harmful nostrums, such
for example as so tinkering with our judicial machinery as to weaken rather
than strengthen our Courts, the true bulwark of an enlightened liberty.
All this means that we should make specific advances in the direction of a
better trained and more efficient Bar. Important as are the functions of
our medical friends, ours, it seems to me, are of still greater vital interest
to individuals and to society, and if they are justified, as events have already
proved they are, in raising the standards of admission to their profession,
certainly we are justified in making equal advances. We are in this respect
the trustees of a great and all comprehending social interest.
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